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Ecosystems as Spontaneous Orders 
Andy Lamey 
Introduction 
The notion of a spontaneous order has long been used to advance a view 
of markets as complex networks of information that no single mind can 
apprehend.1 Traditionally, the impossibility of grasping all of the information 
present in the spontaneous order of the market has been invoked to reject 
central planning. In the hands of Friedrich Hayek, its most prominent 
proponent, such a view was used to argue for the superiority of capitalism. 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall thinkers in Eastern Europe invoked Hayekian 
arguments to explain the failure of Soviet-style communism.2 In recent years 
however Hayek’s argument that modern economies cannot function 
effectively without the information signals contained in prices has been 
embraced by philosophers and economists sympathetic to Marxism. Writers 
such as G.A. Cohen, Meghnad Desai and Theodore Burczak endorse Hayek’s 
critique of central planning while continuing to affirm some version of 
socialist values.3  
                                                
1Hayek outlines several of the key features of a spontaneous order (without using the term 
itself) in, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The American Economic Review, 35 (1945), 519-
30. Hayek’s account is in turn influenced by that of Ludwig Von Mises. See his “Economic 
Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” first published in German in 1920 and 
republished in Collectivist Economic Planning F. A. Hayek ed. (London: George Routledge and 
Sons, 1935). 
2 See Vaclav Klaus, “The University of Chicago and I,” in Renaissance: The Rebirth of Liberty in 
The Heart of Europe (Washington: The Cato Institue, 1997) and Anders Aslund Building 
Capitalism: The Transformation of The Former Soviet Block (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp. 100-101, 392. 
3 G. A. Cohen, Why not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Meghnad 
Desai, Marx’s Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of State Socialism (London, 
Verso, 2002), Theodore Burczak, Socialism After Hayek (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
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The partial embrace of Hayek by socialists belies his reputation as a 
thinker “associated with a pubic policy position, as opposed to a set of 
analytical arguments.”4 Despite what Hayek himself may have thought, the 
use of his ideas is not limited to the applications he made of them. 
Importantly, in the case of his signature concept of spontaneous order, 
socialists are not the only ones who should seek to appropriate it. So too 
should environmental philosophers. Understanding ecosystems as 
spontaneous orders yields conclusions similar to those environmental 
ethicists have long argued for. Just as much as markets, ecosystems contain 
complex networks of information. And much as classical liberals and 
libertarians have sought to protect markets from what they perceive as 
misguided interventions by one particular institution, government, so too 
have environmental ethicists sought to protect the environment from 
misguided interventions by one particular species, homo sapiens. But while the 
spontaneous order concept is widely thought to have considerable 
explanatory power regarding the failure of central planning in the economic 
realm, so far overlooked has been its ability to explain why species extinction 
and related phenomena, such as the introduction of invasive species and 
global warming, are such a disaster on an environmental level. Species are 
similar to prices in being a crucial node of interaction in a larger complex 
system, the full details of which we cannot know. As such anthropogenic 
                                                                                                                                      
Press, 2006). The compatibility of Hayek’s principles with extensive regulation of the 
economy has long been noted by conservative and libertarian critics. For representative 
examples see Alan Ebenstein, Hayek: A Biography, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 
381 note 32. 
4 Peter Boettke, “Why are there no Austrian socialists? Ideology, science and the Austrian 
school,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 17 (1995), p. 35. 
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species extinction can be viewed as akin to price control as a particular form 
of environmental manipulation that our limited knowledge rules out.5 
A conceivable implication of extending spontaneous-order theory to 
environmental ends is that it commits its proponents to endorsing Hayek’s 
political and economic views, which are controversial. It bears mentioning 
that the present account avoids any such outcome. One reason is because 
Hayek’s free-market political views stem from the notion that markets, in 
particular, are spontaneous orders. It is possible however to grant that 
ecosystems are spontaneous orders but markets are not. Additionally, Hayek 
used the notion of spontaneous order in two separate arguments against 
socialism and social justice. One stressed epistemological considerations to 
argue for the limits of our abilities to engage in certain forms of economic 
planning. Hayek’s second argument made a more purely normative claim, to 
the effect that the outcomes of spontaneous orders are not subject to 
considerations of justice. The case for viewing ecosystems as spontaneous 
orders draws on the first argument but not the second. It is thus consistent 
with the view that spontaneous orders, while they are not subject to certain 
forms of manipulation, are nevertheless appropriate subjects of moral 
analysis and concern.  
An attractive feature of spontaneous order theory so understood is its 
ability to provide normative guidance regarding our interactions with the 
environment. This is in part due to the reality of environmental threats such 
as global warming. But the theory’s attractiveness is also due to the ongoing 
division among environmental ethicists regarding the intrinsic value of non-
                                                
5 Related views are discussed (in non-Hayekian terms) in The Virtues of Ignorance: Complexity, 
Sustainability and the Limits of Knowledge, Bill Vitek and Wes Jackson, eds. (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky Press, 2008)  
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sentient life. A fault line has long existed in the environmental ethics 
literature between ethicists who view plants as intrinsically valuable, and 
ethicists whose sphere of moral concern extends at most to animals. The view 
that ecosystems are spontaneous orders recommends restraint in our dealings 
with the natural world, but it neither presumes nor denies that plant life has 
intrinsic moral value. Rather it can be endorsed by thinkers on either side of 
the intrinsic-value debate. While one intrinsic-value theorist, Holmes Rolston 
III, has drawn on a notion of spontaneous order in outlining an 
environmental ethic, it is not only fundamentally incompatible with Hayek’s 
notion but also runs afoul of the fact-value distinction. A third and final 
appeal of the present account is that it is easily sidesteps this problem.  
What is Ecological Order?  
A possible drawback to Hayek’s terminology is that it can inadvertently 
suggest an outdated view of ecosystems. In the early twentieth century 
Henry Gleason challenged the view, associated with Frederic Clements, that 
ecological communities follow a predictable pattern of growth and 
development, nalogous to that of an “superorganism.” If one imagines a 
forest fire, for example, Clements argued that a forest will respond to such a 
disturbance by naturally growing back into a “climax community,” 
understood as the distribution of vegetation best suited to the local 
environment.6 Gleason correctly noted that talk of a “climax community” 
overlooks the extraordinary degree of contingency and flux within ecological 
communities. A forest, rather than naturally growing toward a mature 
                                                
6 Odenbaugh, Jay. “Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Realism About Communities and Ecosystems.” 
Philosophy of Science 74.5 (2007), 629. 
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endpoint, is composed of dynamic and constantly changing elements thrown 
together by chance.  
A Hayekian account of ecosystems, with its references to order, should not 
be misinterpreted as a rejection of this fundamental insight. The order it 
refers to exists at a higher level of abstraction and concerns the underlying 
regulative features of ecosystems. Such features were captured in Arthur 
Tansley’s influential definition of an ecosystem as “the whole system (in the 
sense of physics), including not only the organism complex, but also the 
whole complex of physical factors forming what we call the environment of 
the biome.”7  
Tansley’s definition includes biotic elements such as plants and animals 
and abiotic elements such as temperature, energy and volcanoes. The 
interactions between these elements, particularly as they involve the flow or 
exchange of nutrients and energy, is the underlying order a Hayekian 
account is concerned with.8 As S. T. A. Pickett and M. L. Cadenasso note, this 
definition of ecosystems is “not restricted to equilibrium, or complex, or 
stable systems. In fact, ecosystems may be far from equilibrium, so that they 
are changing in composition, content, or the processing of nutrients and 
energy.”9 On this view ecosystems can be of different sizes and can be 
embedded within one another as parts of a whole.10 They can also include 
human beings and human artifacts, particularly (but not only) in urban 
                                                
7 Tansley, Arthur G. "The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms." Ecology 16.3 (1935), 
299.  
8 The role of nutrients and energy is highlighted by Jay Odenbaugh. See “On the Very Idea of an 
Ecosystem,” in New Waves in Metaphysics, Allan Hazlet ted. (Palgrave: New York, 2010), 247. 
9 Pickett, S. T. A, and M. L Cadenasso. “The Ecosystem as a Multidimensional Concept: Meaning, 
Model, and Metaphor.” Ecosystems 5.1 (2002), 2. 
10 Odenbaugh, “Seeing the Forest and the Trees,” 640. 
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settings.11 In all of these ways ecosystems are similar to economies, which are 
also dynamic, exist within and alongside one another, and of course include 
human beings. On such a view, there is no implication that ecosystems are 
fundamentally static or working toward a state of balance or equilibrium at 
the level of either their biotic or abiotic components.  
Spontaneous Orders 
Hayek argued that there are orders in society that are the result of human 
activity but not of human design. He often cited the example of language. On 
his account it is the result of a process of evolution, the endpoint of which no 
one predicted or organized. Similarly, in the economic sphere, Adam Smith 
famously described the market as an invisible hand in which the individual is 
led to promote ends which he does not deliberately intend. Hence Smith’s 
famous remark about the self-interest of the butcher providing us with our 
dinner. Hayek follows Smith by characterizing the market as a paradigmatic 
spontaneous order, one that no individual has designed and which aims at 
no particular purpose. 
Spontaneous orders have a number of other distinguishing characteristics. 
These can perhaps best be seen by contrasting them with made orders, which 
are relatively simple and contain only as much complexity as their creator 
can grasp. Legal codes, firms, bowling leagues, universities: all would count 
as made orders in Hayek’s sense. Such orders are concrete, in the sense that 
they can be identified by sensory inspection, and serve particular purposes as 
determined by their makers.  
In the case of a spontaneous order the opposite is the case. Spontaneity is 
not the same as complexity, and a spontaneous order can be small-scale and 
                                                
11 Pickett and Cadenasso. “The Ecosystem as a Multidimensional Concept,” 2. 
 7 
simple. Hayek gives the example of iron filings made to arrange themselves 
along the line of force of a magnet. Nevertheless, unlike made orders 
spontaneous ones can exhibit truly enormous complexity. One of Hayek’s 
main contentions is that highly complex orders, comprising as they do more 
facts than any individual mind could ascertain, can only be brought about by 
forces which induce the formation of a spontaneous order, a category which 
does not include a mind trying to deliberately create such an order. 
It is not a necessary condition of being a spontaneous order that it be 
abstract. But again unlike made orders, spontaneous orders can be composed 
of abstract components, as when for example a price is generated in the 
derivatives market. It is a necessary condition of being a spontaneous order 
that it was not created by any outside entity. As such, it has no set end. (This 
is true, Hayek notes, “even though its existence may be very serviceable to 
the individuals which move within such order.”12) There are thus elements of 
a spontaneous order that act to maintain the order, in the sense of allowing it 
to continue to exist through time; but these elements maintain the order 
without bestowing it with a purpose per se, or preventing the contents of the 
order from existing in a state of constant flux. 
Hayek’s central example of a spontaneous order is the market. His analysis 
is meant to warn us off certain forms of market interferences, in particular 
those which seek to control prices. Such forms of intervention are counter-
productive on Hayek’s view, as the price of a good is the result of a wide 
variety of factors, the sum total of which no individual is able to know. As 
                                                
12 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Volume I: Rules and Order (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973), p. 39. 
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Hayek puts it, if we want to understand the price system, we need to 
recognize that is a “mechanism for communicating information”: 
 
The most significant fact about this system is the economy of 
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual 
participants need to know in order to be able to take the right 
action. . . . It is more than a metaphor to described the price system 
as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch 
merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch 
the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities[.]13  
 
To take Hayek’s example, if a product such as tin becomes scarce, it does 
not matter to the potential purchaser whether this is because one of its 
sources has dried up, or because a new use for tin has arisen. In either case 
the price goes up, and this is the only information the purchaser needs to 
know in order to decide whether or not to buy. Were a central planner to seek 
to impose a price on the tin market it would only throw the market into 
disequilibrium, as the balance of forces created by supply and demand would 
be destroyed by superimposing our preferred result on the order’s outcome.14 
The value of prices is that they obviate the need to access knowledge that it 
is impossible for a planner to obtain, “the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place.”15 Hayek gives the examples of a shipper 
who makes his living sending goods on otherwise half-empty tramp-
steamers and a real estate agent whose livelihood hinges on being aware of 
                                                
13 F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” p. 527. 
14 Law Legislation and Liberty Vol I., p. 51. Hayek’s reference to “balance” should not be taken 
to entail the myth of the balance of nature critiqued by Daniel Botkin. See “Adjusting Law to 
Nature’s Discordant Harmonies,” Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum, 7 (1996), 25-38. 
Prices of stocks and other goods are frequently in a state of flux, and the balance here is a 
highly dynamic one.  
15 F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” p. 522. 
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changing and temporary opportunities in the local housing market. Both 
commercial actors perform highly useful activities “based on special 
knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.”16 
The limits on our ability to aggregate the shifting and specific knowledge 
they and countless other market actors possess is what makes prices so 
serviceable—they consolidate and communicate all the information we need 
to make economic decisions. 
Hayek’s critics have long argued that markets do not really match his 
description of a spontaneous order.17 Such a criticism stresses the role 
government plays in enforcing contracts, copyright and other legal 
mechanisms which make markets possible. Perhaps in response to this view, 
Hayek allowed that it is “at least conceivable that the formation of a 
spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately made.”18 In 
such instances, he suggested, we must distinguish the spontaneous character 
of the resulting order from the non-spontaneous origins of the rules or 
regularities which made the order possible.  
How this view accords with Hayek’s more frequent stress on the self-
generating nature of spontaneous orders is not clear. Hayek seems to moot 
the possibility that a spontaneous order is distinct from the conditions that 
bring it into being, but offers little argument for such a view. What is 
important for our purposes however is to note that the concept of 
                                                
16 F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” p. 522. 
17 Steven Lukes, “Invasions of the Market,” From Liberal Values to Democratic Transition: Essays 
in Honour of János Kis, Ronald Dworkin ed. (Budapest: Central European University press, 
2004), p. 69; Amaratya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 166. 
18 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, p. 46.  
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spontaneous order is larger than that of the market. Hayek’s examples of 
spontaneous orders include an individual organism, crystals, complex 
organic compounds such as chemicals, the distribution of iron filings on a 
piece of paper held over a magnet, cultural customs, portions of the law and 
moral codes.19 Although markets are Hayek’s primary concern, the 
generalizations Hayek makes about spontaneous orders extend beyond them.  
This is worth emphasizing because it is possible to endorse the notion of a 
spontaneous order without committing oneself to the view that markets are 
spontaneous orders. Hayekian economic and philosophical views are 
controversial, and the notion that ecosystems are spontaneous orders will 
seem unattractive to some if it entails endorsing laissez-faire premises. But it 
is perfectly consistent to maintain that ecosystems are spontaneous orders 
while denying that markets are. One can for example endorse the commonly 
stated view that because markets depend crucially on government 
enforcement of contracts, as Hayek himself admits, it is misleading to 
characterize them as spontaneous in any fundamental sense, and instead 
hold that they are appropriately regulated to a greater degree than Hayek 
would allow. Such a view is only consistent with denying that there is any 
equivalent external force which maintains ecosystems and which makes them 
appropriately subject to a high degree of intrusive management. For anyone 
uncomfortable with Hayek’s demarcation of the economic and political 
landscape, therefore, the application of the spontaneous order concept to 
natural ecosystems includes a golden road of escape.  
Ecosystems as Spontaneous Orders 
                                                
19 Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol I., pp. 37 (organism); 39-40 (crystals, complex organic 
compounds, iron filings); 46 (law, morals, customs). 
 11 
The upshot of Hayek’s analysis was invariably to argue for some form of 
non-intervention in the market. In making his case, Hayek frequently 
invoked examples of spontaneous orders in the natural world. Given this it 
would seem natural to ask whether we might also have some obligation of 
non-intervention concerning spontaneous orders in nature.  
The first step in answering this question is to note the obvious ways in 
which ecosystems match Hayek’s description of a spontaneous order. If 
anything can fairly be described as self-generating their underlying process 
of energy and nutrient echange can. Human beings arrived into a world in 
which ecosystems already existed, and if we were to disappear they would 
live on after us. And while natural systems may have many functions, it is 
only consistent with evolutionary theory to say they have no purpose, let 
alone a conscious mind directing them. Hayek stressed that any large scale 
economy is really the sum total of numerous inter-related economies.20 This 
idea of orders-within orders applies equally to the case of ecosystems, whose 
internal elements are constantly interacting with one another, and which see 
local ecosystems existing as part of larger regional and ultimately global 
ones.  
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, ecosystems are subject of enormous 
amounts of constantly changing information which it is impossible for us to 
ever be fully cognizant. Ecological relations include interbreeding, and 
“competition for shared resources such as food, light and habitat . . . 
Likewise, ecological communities are causally connected through predator 
prey, interspecific competition, mutualism, amensalism, commensalism, and 
                                                
20 Law Legislation and Liberty Vol. II, p. 108. 
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so on, relations.”21 This web of relations is just as dynamic and complex as 
that found in markets. To be fully aware of what was happening in every 
given relation at any given time it would require extensive knowledge of 
time and place, or the same type of aggregate information that Hayek 
characterized as being beyond the reach of central planners. In the 
environmental case just as much as the economic one, it is unlikely we will 
even be able to ascertain complete knowledge of all the diverse elements that 
make up the global ecosystem. 
Two Kinds of Ecological Ignorance 
There are ways in which our ignorance of ecosystems differs from our 
ignorance of the factors driving prices. It may be helpful therefore to 
distinguish two different kinds of ignorance regarding the natural world, in 
order to clarify which kind is relevant to a spontaneous order-based account. 
The first type of ignorance concerns our limited awareness of what the 
natural world contains. One 2011 study estimated that the total number of 
species on planet earth is 8.7 million, plus or minus 1.3 million, of which only 
1.3 million have been catalogued.22 Such figures reveal the scope of our 
current ignorance of all the elements found in the natural world. It is 
sobering to note that habitat loss has been identified as a primary threat to 85 
percent of the species included in the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature’s Red List of threatened or endangered species. This 
                                                
21 Odenbaugh, “On the Very Idea of an Ecosystem,” 241. 
22 C. Mora, D. Tittensor, S. Adl, A Simpson, B. Worm. “How Many Species Are There on 
Earth and in the Ocean?” PLoS Biology 9 (2011), e1001127. The study has been criticized for 
underestimating the total number of species. See C. Zimmer, “How Many Species? A Study 
Says 8.7 Million, but It’s Tricky,” The New York Times, August 30, 2011. 
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dispiriting trend must be causing the extinction of a large number of species 
that will never be known to us in living form. 
As tragic as our ignorance of countless species is however, it is not the type 
of ignorance that the spontaneous order model emphasizes. The precise 
number of all species on the planet is knowable: scientists are estimated to 
discover 15,000 new species every year.23 As glaring as our current ignorance 
of planetary life is, therefore, it is the kind of information that could be 
ascertained. Certainly it is knowledge that a single mind can in principle 
apprehend.  
The ignorance spontaneous order theory is concerned with has to do with 
the permanent limitations of our factual knowledge: up-to-date information 
about the internal flux of a dynamic order.24 In the case of prices, if we sought 
to investigate the exact nature of all the factors influencing them on a given 
day, they would be too diverse and ever-changing to identify. Our ignorance 
regarding the total number of species in existence at a given time involves a 
more or less static body of knowledge. Our ignorance concerning the teeming 
interactions of countless different organisms, by contrast, concerns a dynamic 
subject. It is the latter type of ignorance and the limit it places on our ability 
to successfully manipulate nature that the spontaneous view emphasizes.  
Species as System Input and Output  
Much of Hayek’s analysis concerned the special undesirability of 
interfering with prices as opposed to other forms of economic intervention. 
Are there any natural elements that play a similar role in spontaneous natural 
                                                
23 See Zimmer, 2011. 
24 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol I, p. 11. 
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orders, standing as the ecological element that we should be especially loath 
to manipulate?  
Answering this question requires recalling just why price interference is 
unattractive. Price-setting by a central planner targets the most visible output 
of a larger system of information circulation and exchange. Crucially, the 
spontaneous price is both an output and an input, the place in the system that 
allows the forces of supply and demand to interact. The disappearance of the 
unplanned price thus has a follow-on effect elsewhere in the system, causing 
it to cease functioning. In the case of tin, the supply either dries up or finds an 
outlet on the black market, and the price of replacement metals and/or goods 
normally made from tin will also be disrupted. Are there any elements in an 
ecosystem that play a similar double-sided role? That is, are there visible 
elements which are formed by invisible forces within a larger system, and 
which in turn influence the actions of other elements in the system? 
The most plausible candidate is species.25 In the case of both plants and 
animals it is the product of the countless actions of individual organisms. Its 
birth is the product of a variety of competitive forces: those between the 
individual members of its immediate ancestor species; between its ancestor 
species and its environment; and between its ancestor species and other 
species. These competitive forces combine in unpredictable ways to create a 
new form of life. Our ability to manipulate these processes in a manner that 
results in ecosystem-sustaining outcomes is severely limited by our ignorance 
                                                
25 I do not take sides in the debate as to whether species are individuals, sets “homeostatic property 
clusters,” etc. My account is compatible with any of these views and with some forms of species 
pluralism. For an overview of the debate see Richard Richards, The Species Problem: A Philosophical 
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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of time and place concerning the many different entities that contribute to the 
creation of a species. 
To illustrate this imagine an attempt to artificially recreate a species. Let us 
start with a species that is extinct. It is possible to know what a dodo looked 
like and what its typical behaviors were, such as its inability to fly. It is also in 
principle possible to know how many dodos lived on Maritius, their natural 
habitat, pre-extinction. And it may someday even be possible to duplicate 
this number in the form of dodo-like android that mimic dodo behaviours, 
which we might even release into the Maritian wild.  
The present account does not rule out the possibility that releasing the 
robotic dodos could have limited value as a form of environmental 
restoration. But now suppose we wished to program the mechanical birds so 
that they mimicked the movements that the original dodo population would 
have engaged in had its members continued to exist. On a day when x 
number of organic dodos would have been found in a certain area of a forest, 
the same number of synthetic dodos would now be found there. However 
many organic dodos would have eaten fruit that day; or laid an egg; or 
sought shelter from the rain; or left the forest to seek food by the shore; or 
died—our synthetic dodos would be programmed to engage in all the 
identical behaviors in the same places at the same time.  
It is the knowledge required for this kind of programming that is 
permanently unknown to us. Crucially, it would be impossible to apprehend 
even if dodos still existed and we were able to capture all the dodos on 
Mauritus and replace them with synthetic birds. An awareness of the location 
of every migrating pod of whales or murder of crows, and their interactions 
with each other, with other species and with their larger environment—all 
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this is just as unpredictable as the location of every source of tin or person in 
need of tin cans. In the case of ecosystems, we would need to predict the 
interactions of not just one species but many, as well as all the changes they 
caused in the environment, and which the environment in turn caused on 
other animals.  
The difficulty of knowing the many diverse interactions of countless 
individual organisms is especially brought home when we recall that 
evolution remains an ongoing process, with new species still appearing. 
When we try to imagine predicting in advance the make-up of  future species 
we come to a final parallel to Hayek’s account of prices. Hayek once quoted 
with approval the observation of a previous writer that “no scientist has ever 
used [evolutionary] theory to foretell the coming into existence or creatures 
of a novel species, still less verified his forecast.”26 Hayek did not have an 
environmental application of his philosophy in mind when making this 
remark, but it speaks to such a concern. Nothing may be less knowable than 
the biodiversity that would otherwise arise when we intervene in nature in a 
manner that causes species loss.  
One thing we do know is that when ecosystems are left to their own 
devices many of their individual elements may come and go but their 
underlying processes of energy and nutrient exchange are likely to maintain 
themselves through time in a manner that sustains all of our environmental 
needs. We do not know that we can intervene in nature in such a way as to 
achieve the same end, let alone improve on nature’s ability to perpetuate 
itself. Our ignorance makes the chance of unwanted unsustainable outcomes 
                                                
26 F. A. Hayek, “The Theory of Complex Phenomena,” in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics ( London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 31. 
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very high. Such a pessimistic view is born out by the current state of the 
global environment, which has seen a dramatic loss of species diversity. 
Given this reality we are well advised when considering two courses of 
action to prefer the one that, all else being equal, impacts species diversity the 
least.  
In this way species play a role broadly analogous to that of prices. A 
species is in its own manner a visible node in a larger system containing 
many invisible elements which will remain unknowable to us, precisely 
because of their ever-changing nature. In the natural domain just as much as 
the economic one, we are faced with dynamic systems which we cannot 
entirely master. Our ability to manage both systems is limited, in that there 
are circumstances in which it will be best not to seek to make it produce a 
preferred outcome, whether directly in the form of wage and price controls or 
in the more indirect manner that is more typical in the case of ecosystems. To 
be sure, in an environmental context, no one deliberately set out to make grey 
whales critically endangered the way central planners deliberately seek to set 
prices. Species loss is usually the by-product of another goal, such as clear-
cutting a wilderness to build a subdivision or establish a mine. What is 
important however is not the conscious intention of our actions but their 
effect. Destroying a rainforest to build a highway is an intrusion, insofar as 
we delimit the area in which species can function and perpetuate themselves.  
It is debatable whether animals possess knowledge the way Hayek’s 
examples of the shipper and real estate agent do. Even so, the analogy 
between economic and ecological ignorance does not depend on there being a 
knower in the natural world who is self-consciously aware of local particulars 
the way human economic agents are. What is important rather is the way 
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species, like prices, can function as proxies for a much larger body of 
information. The presence of a species in its natural habitat is also due to 
countless individual actions of fleeting moments unknowable to us. When we 
allow an ecosystem to sort out for itself what species it will possess, we will 
not be able to articulate all of the precise natural interactions which 
determined the final total. Nevertheless, the presence of such species plays a 
broadly similar role of condensing and assimilating large amounts of 
information unknowable to an external observer. The smaller the number of 
such species that are made extinct or endangered by humans, the healthier 
we can take the ecosystem to be, even if we are unable to articulate the many 
different instances in which a particular species contributes to ecosystem 
health or the ways in which it typically does so. Crucial to know is that its 
presence in the ecosystem is naturally occurring. The more we can be sure of 
this, the more we can be sure that a condition of ecosystem health has been 
met.  
On this approach there is an important difference between the economic 
and environmental cases. In the latter we need to identify whether or not a 
species is native, and whether its numbers have been decimated by human 
beings. This is admittedly a higher cognitive burden than we face in the 
economic realm, when we need to know the price and only the price. But this 
difference does not affect the central similarity, which is the idea of the native 
species serving as a signal that renders it unnecessary to obtain a much larger 
body of knowledge which it is impossible for us to know, namely the 
knowledge of all the particular actions which caused the species to become a 
natural part of the ecosystem. When the ecosystem is allowed to determine 
for itself which species it contains we can take it for granted that the presence 
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of any given species is performing servicable functions, even if we are unable 
to say precisely what they are. 
None of this is to suggest that species signals and price signals play 
precisely identical roles. One is hard pressed for example to think of an 
ecological equivalent to black markets, which are a predictable consequence 
of central planning. Nevertheless, to intervene in an ecosystem and deprive it 
of a species is to create an impact on it that has a disruptive follow-on effect 
on the larger system. As Hayek writes in one of many passages that apply to 
an ecosystem just as much as markets, “there will be many aspects of it over 
which we will possess no control at all, or which at least we shall not be able 
to alter without interfering with—and to that extent impeding—the forces 
producing the spontaneous order.”27 
Ramifications of the Spontaneous Order View 
Characterizing ecosystems as spontaneous orders will have normative 
ramifications so long as we endorse the uncontroversial view that we have 
moral obligations not to harm human beings. Human beings depend on 
healthy ecosystems for their own health and survival. As a result we cannot 
be indifferent to the fate of ecosystems. Yet if ecosystems are properly 
understood as spontaneous orders we must acknowledge that they are all too 
easily damaged by anthropogenic species loss. Hence we have a prima facie 
reason to limit human-caused extinctions.  
Such a reason is only strengthened if we recognize animals as subjects of 
moral concern. But whether or not we recognize moral claims on behalf of 
animals, our rationale for preferring environmentally sustainable outcomes 
over non-sustainable ones, all else being equal, does not presuppose that the 
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non-sentient life within ecosystems possess intrinsic moral value. Although 
such a view has long been prominent in the environmental ethics literature 
the present account needs only presuppose that human beings, at most, 
posses direct moral standing. It is when this uncontroversial view is 
combined with the spontaneous order view of nature that the latter’s 
normative implications emerge. While such an account generates a de facto 
obligation to preserve the non-sentient life in natural systems, this is because 
doing so meets our obligation not to harm human (and perhaps other) 
beings.  
One can draw an analogy here to an application on a computer which 
performs an important function, such a browsing the Web or creating a 
document, beyond actually operating the computer itself. Even though 
computer applications requires an operating system to work, the question of 
what applications a computer has is crucial to determining its functionality. 
We see the importance of individual applications most clearly when they 
allow us to perform some function we especially value. Understanding 
ecosystems as spontaneous orders is the philosophical equivalent of an 
application in that it is compatible with more than one moral operating 
system, whether that system recognizes moral standing in anthropocentric, 
zooocentric or ecocentric terms.  
This compatibility with different background systems is part of what 
makes the model attractive. So is the fact that even when it is added to a 
moral framework which recognizes only human standing, it still generates 
normative reasons for environmental preservation. (When it is combined 
with frameworks that recognize animal and plant standing it adds to the 
reasons such approaches already recommend for environmental protection). 
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This is a significant ramification of the model, even if an antecedent moral 
framework is also required for it to generate normative conclusions.  
Viewing ecosystems as spontaneous orders does not entail that changing 
the natural environment is always wrong. Part of Hayek’s argument has to 
do with scale. His argument leaves open the possibility that socialism could 
work in small face to face groups. It is when we confront the diffuse 
information that makes up something as large an impersonal as a modern 
economy that we find our ignorance a serious barrier. Similarly, on a natural 
level we can maintain a garden without concern that doing so will cause the 
local ecosystem to collapse. But were we to seek to transplant the principles 
that govern our interactions with the garden to the broader ecosystem we 
would be courting disaster. For in the case of the latter we encounter a large 
and complex network of information that resists our ability to manipulate it.  
The present view does not entail that we must preserve species at all costs. 
When a species goes extinct naturally this is no cause for alarm, as nature is 
taking its course. The outcome may be the same as with anthropogenic 
extinction, but the process by which it occurs is very different. In one case but 
not the other we can be confident that the extinction will not erode an 
ecosystem’s ability to perpetuate the ongoing existence of its biotic 
components. Indeed, natural extension is properly viewed as one of the 
means by which ecosystems ensure their ongoing existence. 
 Anthropogenic extinction is different. In such cases we cause nature to go 
off course as it were by denying it one of the elements it has traditionally 
used to perpetuate itself. When a species goes extinct due to human impacts 
on the environment, we should be aware that this can and often does have a 
negative impact on the ecosystem in which the species lived. in particular we 
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can no longer take it for granted that the ecosstem’s ability to sustain human 
and other life has not in some way been limited or compromised. This is the 
case, we have seen, even though we will not be able to articulate all of the 
negative effects of any given extinction.  
A concern with minimizing anthropogenic species loss will have 
additional ramifications beyond a concern with avoiding actions which 
directly cause such extinctions. There is also the closely related issue of 
invasive species, or those introduced into an ecosystem by human beings. A 
well-known example concerns the introduction of cane toads into Australia 
in the 1930s. Originally introduced to control the cane beetle population, they 
became widespread and caused the depletion of native species and fauna, 
poisoning of animals and humans and other ongoing problems. More 
recently, invasive plant species have become so common in Australia that 
they total 17 percent of all wild plant species on the continent and cost the 
Australian economy more than three billion dollars a year.28  
The Australian experience illustrates a global trend. Invasive plants 
commonly benefit from the habitat degradation they cause by facing less 
competition for resources. They thus often colonize their new habitat and 
make a significant contribution to species loss. This negative process has been 
termed the McDonaldization of world ecology, in that exotic species are 
closely associated with a reduction in species diversity.29 In the words of 
ecologist Stephen Goosem, “we have created a situation in which a 
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tremendous mixing of plant species is occurring to the extent that it has 
become an important component of human-induced global change.”30 
It does not seem realistic to think that we might continue to introduce 
invasive species but halt the problems they cause after the introduction stage. 
Thus, in addition to an obligation to not cause species loss directly, we also 
have a pro tanto obligation not to introduce additional exotic species. This is 
because we are again in a situation of ignorance when it comes to imagining 
the precise distribution of other living things and landscape elements that 
would have been the case without the new species. We are unable to 
apprehend and the countless instances of interaction they would have 
engaged in and the ongoing dynamic effects on the local and other 
ecosystems. Crucially, this includes events that might be steps toward the 
evolution of a new species or new habitat for an existing species. As with 
direct species loss, invasive species have a negative follow-on effect on the 
larger ecosystem, all the aspects of which we may not know.  
If the spontaneous order model can explain why we should avoid causing 
extinctions and introducing exotic species, it can also explain why global 
warming is to be avoided. Anthropogenic warming is one of the most 
extensive systematic changes imaginable, one with countless consequences 
beyond the global temperature itself. Staying with extinction, we need only 
look at a recent scientific examination of the possible effects of global 
warming on 25 biodiversity hotspots that account for 44 percent of global 
plant species and 35 percent of vertebrate animal species. The study found 
that the widely predicted trend of a doubling in global carbon-dioxide levels 
could result in a loss of 56,000 plant and 3,700 endemic vertebrate species in 
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the affected regions.31 A separate multi-region study predicted that global 
warming will see 18-35 percent of animal and plant species committed to 
extinction by 2050 depending on the degree of global warming that is 
allowed to occur.32 This much we can know: unchecked global warming will 
be an ecological disaster. A concern with the irreplaceable unit of the species 
is thus connected to other issues, and can ground our concern with 
preserving biodiversity and halting global warming, two destructive impacts 
on the natural world that erode the ability of spontaneous ecological orders 
to comfortable support human and non-human life.  
Manipulating Species, Manipulating Nature 
The present analysis does not imply that all forms of species manipulation 
are wrong, let along that manipulating the environment itself must always be 
avoided. We manipulate species in many different ways other than causing 
the to go extinct. One obvious way is through efforts which seek to restore 
the numbers of a species that has become critically endangered due to human 
action. This is a form of species manipulation just as much as anthropocentric 
extinction is. The later cases however is corrective, and seeks to restore the a 
natural system a node that human action has eliminated. It seems reasonable 
to place the two forms of manipulation, one disruptive the other corrective, in 
different categories. Unlike species extinctions, species restoration efforts do 
not remove from nature a primary unit of self-maintenance. Rather they 
replenish natural systems by working directly against such losses. 
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Speaking of interventions in markets, Hayek remarked that “’interference’ 
implies the operation of a process that proceeds by itself on certain principles 
because its parts obey certain rules. We would not call it interference if we 
oiled a clockwork, or in any other way secured the conditions that a going 
mechanism required for its proper functioning.”33 This remark suggests that 
actions by outside entities affecting spontaneous orders are not always to be 
lamented. Actions which contribute to the same outcome as the order does 
when left to its own devices will be in harmony with that order. Of course we 
might wonder if we will ever be in a position to know in advance the 
outcome of a particular order. But what is worth considering is the thought 
that interventions in a spontaneous order can be disruptive to a greater or 
lesser degree. 
It is against this backdrop that we can distinguish the above-mentioned 
case of releasing cane toads into Australia from efforts to re-introduce an 
endangered species into its natural habitat. Both involve human beings 
introducing animals into an ecosystem. In the first case the action involves 
the introduction of an exotic species. But in cases of the latter kind the re-
introduction is an attempt to mitigate the negative effects of previous human 
actions, such as habitat destruction or hunting, which caused the species to 
disappear from the local ecosystem. The reintroduction thus “follows 
nature’s lead” by restoring the species which short-sighted human action 
placed under stress. This is very different from the destructive action 
represented by releasing an exotic species into the wild. Re-introduction is in 
keeping with an ecosystems natural workings whereas exotic introductions 
are not. This is why in the robotic dodo scenario it is acceptable to attempt re-
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introduction, even though reintroduction can never be a full substitute for a 
species continued uninterrupted existence.  
It is necessary to distinguish between different ways of manipulating 
species and ecosystem in nature because our relationship with the latter is not 
only one of distance. It is also one of cultivation. It is a myth to think we 
might never “intervene” in nature. There is rather a rough ecological 
equivalent to Hayek’s distinction between the grown and the made order, in 
the difference between natural and domesticated landscapes. Hayek speaks 
of the family, the plant and the firm as examples of organizations, and it is 
tempting to view the farm, the field and the greenhouse are their organic 
equivalents. Hayek’s contrast however was a sharp one, noting that direct 
commands had a place within an organization. When it comes to 
domesticated zones, however, there is a limit even here to how we can 
manipulate them: we are still at the mercy of insects, drought and hurricanes 
when it comes to farming, for example. We can manipulate farmland to make 
it more fecund, but must do so in a manner mindful of the natural systems of 
domesticated plants and animals. The boundary between a grown and a 
made landscape can also change. This does not mean we can regard every 
ecosystem simply as a cultivated acre in waiting. For all the reasons I have 
been mentioning, it is a mistake to think we can take all or even most of 
nature under our control.  
Nevertheless, it is very much the case that human beings need to 
manipulate nature. Given the inevitability of our involvement and interaction 
with ecosystems, it bears noting what the spontaneous order model says 
about such activities. While it rules out species extinction and related 
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activities which contribute to it, it does not posit a view of nature as 
something apart from us which we can never seek to manipulate or change.  
Consider the practice of geoengineering, one of the most profound forms 
of environmental manipulation now possible. In the age of global warming, 
we have become familiar with cap and trade schemes or proposals for a 
carbon tax. What such solutions have in common is that they would reduce 
the overall amount of greenhouse gas released into the atmosphere. On both 
approaches the solution to global warming is not more atmospheric 
interventionism but less. Geoengineering is  based on the opposite approach. 
It has been defined as the “intentional manipulation of planetary systems at a 
global scale,” and is commonly put forward as a means of addressing 
anthropogenic climate change.34 One proposal for example is to cool the 
surface of the earth by releasing sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere that 
would function as a shield against incoming radiation.35 Another proposal, 
put into effect off the coast of Western Canada in 2012, involved an attempt 
to fertilize the ocean through large-scale deposits of iron sulphate, the goal 
being to increase the population of phytoplankton, an absorber of carbon 
dioxide.  
Such schemes attracted accusations of “ecopiracy,” with critics arguing 
that their long-term effects are unknown and potentially destructive.36 On the 
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spontaneous order account it will turn out as no surprise if such efforts prove 
less effective than attempts to combat global warming that involve reducing 
the human impact on the environment. It will only show once again that 
there is a complexity to ecosystems that exceed our attempts at mastery. 
Nevertheless, only some forms of geoengineering are categorically ruled out 
on the present account. These are geoengineering projects that directly or 
indirectly contribute to anthropogenic species extinction. Forms of 
geoengineer that avoid this outcome are not something that can be judged at 
an a priori level. It is an empirical question whether any given one can 
achieve some benefit, and so they must be judged on a case by case basis. In 
this way geoengineering projects which do not reduce species diversity stand 
in for all other forms of environmental manipulation that also avoid human-
caused extinction. They are in a different category from manipulations which 
remove from an ecosstem one of the central nodes through which its various 
elements interact, develop and evolve.   
Spontaneous Order Versus Intrinsic Value 
I have now made the central case for thinking of ecosystems as 
spontaneous orders. There is however an additional aspect of the model 
worth mentioning. A major concern of environmental ethicists has long been 
to argue against environmentally disruptive practices. For many ethicists the 
basis for this stance has been the intrinsic value of all life, including non-
sentient life.37 Such a view however has been subject to powerful criticisms.38 
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Given this, it is an advantage of the spontaneous order view that while it too 
places limits on the degree to which we can hope to disrupt the natural 
world, it does not require endorsing the view that plants have moral 
standing.  
This aspect of the spontaneous order model is worth stressing, for there is 
a rival view which invokes the spontaneity of natural systems as grounds to 
argue for the intrinsic value of non-sentient life. Holmes Rolston III mentions 
the idea that ecosystems are spontaneous orders in making the case for direct 
duties toward nature. As Rolston puts it: 
 
There is a kind of order that arises spontaneously and 
systematically when many self-concerned units jostle and seek 
their own programs, each doing their own thing and forced into 
informed interaction with other units. In culture, the logic of 
language or the integrated efficiency of the market are examples. 
No one individual orders either of these, but there is much 
rationality in both. In nature, an ecosystem systematically 
generates spontaneous order, an order that exceeds in richness, 
beauty, integrity, and dynamic stability the order of any of the 
component parts, an order that feeds (and is fed by) the richness, 
beauty, and integrity of these component parts.  
 
 
Hayek is not mentioned by Rolston, who may not have been aware of the 
Hayek’s use of “spontaneous order” as a term of art. Hayek for example 
thought that associating markets with reason was but a step on the road to 
central planning: he would thus never exclaim about how much rationality 
they contain. That difference aside, there is an obvious similarity between 
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Hayek and Rolston. Both write of decentralized systems that are self-
generating and self-sustaining and cite markets and ecosystems as examples. 
This similarity however is accompanied by a crucial difference. Rolston 
goes on to argue that the richness, beauty and integrity of an ecosystems are 
markers of its intrinsic value. Rolston here draws an analogy between our 
evaluation of an ecosystem and a culture. A culture is rich, diverse and 
beautiful because it is the creation of a huge number of different intellects, 
outstripping the value of anything under the centralized control of a single 
consciousness. “Analogously, ecosystems are in some respects more to be 
admired than any of their component organisms, because they have 
generated, continue to support, and integrate tens of thousands of member 
organisms. The ecosystem is as wonderful as anything it contains.”39 The 
spontaneity of an ecological order on Rolston’s account is thus not only 
something we should admire but something that makes ecosystems “places 
of value capture” and thus subjects of moral concern.40  
This understanding of the relationship between a spontaneous order and 
moral value is very different from anything found in Hayek. According to 
Hayek, just and unjust are concepts best reserved for analysis of human 
conduct. “If we apply the terms to a state of affairs, they have meaning only 
in so far as we hold someone responsible for bringing it about or allowing it 
to come about.”41 For this reason Hayek argued that the concept of justice had 
no application to the outcome of a spontaneous order. If we think of the 
overall distribution of wealth in society, it is the outcome of human action in 
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the causal sense that it the result of millions of different human actions. But if 
someone were to object on moral grounds to a given distribution, there 
would be “no individual and no co-operating group of people against which 
the sufferer would have a just complaint.”42 
Hayek and Rolston thus have diametrically opposed understandings of the 
relationship between spontaneous order and ethical judgement. For Rolston 
the diversity and complexity of a spontaneous order contributes to its moral 
value. For Hayek on the other hand the products of spontaneous order 
render moral judgements about the orders outcome inoperative. It is a 
mistake on Hayek’s view to say that the complexity of spontaneous orders 
generates intrinsic value, as the result of the order is better seen as escaping 
the framework of moral value altogether. 
Hayek’s analysis here is tied to his rejection of social justice. This aspect of 
his philosophy is controversial and out of step with how economic 
distribution is widely viewed in the modern world, namely, as very much a 
matter of justice. When the notion of spontaneous order is applied to 
ecosystems, however, the same notion has a more intuitive outcome. There is 
considerable violence and pain in nature. Predators tear apart prey animals 
and both predators and prey can be victims of exposure, starvation or fire. 
We do not normally think we have an obligation to prevent suffering in the 
wild, even small-scale occurrences we could easily prevent (as by, for 
example, rescuing small numbers of prey animals from violent deaths and 
making them our pets, or in some other way looking after them). It is 
tempting to follow Hayek in saying that such outcomes are beyond morality 
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because, as they outcomes of a spontaneous order, no conscious agent or 
agents brought them about. 
As attractive as this response would be, however, I believe it is a mistake.  
Despite its difference from Rolston Hayek’s account of the relationship 
between spontaneous order and justice suffers from the same problem as 
Rolston’s, in that both theories would seem to ignore the fact-value 
distinction. It seems no more legitimate to cite facts about the origin of a state 
of affairs as placing it beyond justice than it does to say they generate 
intrinsic value. At the least, we are owed more than either Hayek or Rolston 
offer in regard to why the fact-value distinction does not stymie either 
analysis. 
A second problem emerges when we ask whether we do in fact want to see 
every product of nature placed beyond justice. To see the issue here, it is 
helpful to recall the reaction is to predictable natural disasters. If we think of 
a hurricane, such as the one that struck New Orleans in 2005, it does seem 
strange to think that the coming of the hurricane was itself an act of injustice. 
The strangeness is rooted in the reason Hayek offers, namely, that on a 
modern understanding of the natural world, we do not recognize 
intentionality in a storm. 
Nevertheless, such disasters do give rise to charges of injustice when those 
in a position to mitigate their destructiveness are perceived not to have done 
so. Hurricane Katrina, which saw a variety of government agencies accused 
of serious irresponsibility, is a paradigm example. Such debates are very 
much carried out in the language of justice, on the grounds that the 
authorities allowed unnecessary calamities to happen. Hayek seems to allow 
for such charges of injustice when he refers to injustice that arises as the 
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result of someone “allowing it to come about.” But if we can be criticized on 
grounds of justice for not stopping the preventable negative outcomes of 
spontaneous orders, then the fact that their primary cause was not human 
does not suffice to place them beyond the reach of justice. We also need to 
know if there was a human agent who could have stopped their negative 
outcome but did not.  
For the same reason, although we might not feel compelled to stop a wild 
bear from scooping a salmon into its mouth, were the bear to threaten a 
human in a manner that we could easily prevent, it does seem wrong of us 
not to stop it. In both the case of the salmon and the human, the threat is 
caused by something other than a human agent. This again suggests that the 
cause by itself is not sufficient grounds to make all judgements of justice 
concerning spontaneous orders “a category mistake,” as Hayek puts it.43  
In Hayek’s work the notion of spontaneous order thus ultimately appears 
in two separate arguments against central planning. One is based on an 
epistemological claim about the scope of our ignorance. The other is based on 
a more purely normative claim about the illusory nature of social justice. The 
present analysis takes over the first argument but not the second. In this way 
it affords an additional avenue of escape from Hayek’s political conclusions. 
It also in my view represents a more plausible understanding of the upshot of 
identifying a complex system, whether ecological or financial, as a 
spontaneous order. That upshot is one that many environmental ethicists will 
find amenable, even if it does not entail that plant life has moral standing. 
Conclusion 
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The preceding account takes seriously the idea that there is an affinity 
regarding our ignorance of financial and ecological systems. In both cases 
there is an element generated from within necessary for the successful 
function of the entire system, and we do well to let both elements, price and 
species, find their own level rather than subject either to manipulation. When 
we do seek to manipulate the natural world, as we inevitably must, we 
should do so in a manner that seeks as much as possible to preserve the 
number of species it contains.  
Hayek’s economic and political philosophy was a product of 1920s Austria 
and the communist calculation debate that raged in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution. Lenin and other communists thought that the economy could be 
subject to central planning, but this turned out not to be the case. Hayek’s 
philosophy rose to prominence in part because it offered an explanation as to 
why central planning did not work, an explanation many people have found 
compelling. Today we still struggle to administer economic policies that will 
advance human welfare—a struggle we should continue, despite Hayek’s 
rejection of social justice. But we are also faced with a new challenge, in the 
form of the global environmental crisis. It seems reasonable to think that a 
theory that has borne valuable insights in the economic realm might also 
yield insights in the ecological one, which is also a realm of great complexity, 
about which our ignorance is likely to remain permanent and deadly.  
 
